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RYAN C. HENDRICKSON
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T

he North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) continues to be the subject
of considerable academic scrutiny and criticism. Starting with the Soviet
Union’s collapse and continuing through the bitter transatlantic dispute over
Operation Iraqi Freedom, analysts in Europe and the United States have confidently predicted NATO’s destiny of irrelevancy, if not total collapse. The view
that the “United States is from Mars and Europe is from Venus” permeated
much of the discussion surrounding NATO’s future and its alleged trend toward insignificance.1 American unilateralism under President George W. Bush
and the views expressed by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld—
that the future of multilateral security centers around “coalitions of the willing”
rather than NATO, and that “old Europe” was out of step with modern security
necessities—did much to lend credence to this view. 2 The acrid debate over
Iraq between former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and President
George W. Bush, whose immediate predecessors arguably built the foundation
for NATO’s post-Cold War survival, provided some observers with bona fide
evidence of NATO’s downfall.3
These perspectives capture part of NATO’s evolution in one of its more
difficult periods. NATO has not been without trials and tribulations in its
post-Cold War life. Such views, however, often focus heavily on recent conflictridden aspects of the transatlantic relationship and fail to recognize why NATO
continues to exist and play an instrumental role in fostering transatlantic security
interests. This article provides a more balanced assessment of the alliance.
Through a brief examination of NATO’s history and ability to overcome previous crises, coupled with an analysis of the ongoing impact of NATO’s expansion, its institutional flexibility to reshape itself after 9/11, and the renewed
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interest from NATO’s great powers, this analysis helps explain why NATO’s
skeptics have inaccurately portrayed the alliance’s current condition. While it is
clear that the transatlantic marriage remains rocky at times, such “gloom and
doom” scenarios of NATO that are so popular today misrepresent the alliance’s
previous achievements and ongoing security functions. The article begins with a
brief survey of recent literature on NATO, follows with a short summary of
NATO’s ability to overcome previous crises, and continues with an analysis of
NATO’s ongoing security functions and transformation. The article concludes
with a discussion of how the major powers continue to utilize NATO within their
larger national security policies, all of which gives reason to be skeptical about
NATO’s current critics and doomsayers.

NATO Skeptics
In the lead-up to the war in Iraq, with the NATO allies sorely divided
over whether to provide defensive measures to protect Turkey in the event that
Iraq decided to attack, then US Ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns, referred to the political differences at NATO as a “crisis of credibility.” 4 The debate over how to address Saddam Hussein, coupled with the United States’
decision to act without NATO in its 2001 strikes on the Taliban after 9/11, led a
number of observers to argue that by 2003, NATO’s place in transatlantic security had been badly, if not irreparably damaged. To many analysts it appeared
that the United States, under President George W. Bush, had moved in a completely different direction from the European public and many European governments. In contrast to the Clinton administration, President Bush was viewed
in Europe as far more unilateral and nationalistic in pursuing his administration’s foreign policy ambitions, which had provoked a visceral political backlash from many in Europe, especially Belgium, France, and Germany.5
Analysts also point to NATO’s war in Kosovo, noting that the military
differences between the United States and Europe, and the absence of interoperable weaponry among the allies, made for an unequal partnership at best.
The vast differences in military capabilities made many European militaries unattractive, if not unhelpful partners to the United States. Moreover, the joint war
planning efforts in 1999, which involved debates over tactical decisions of the
war, rubbed many American military planners the wrong way and consequently
placed NATO’s functional future in question.6
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Still others stress that post-Cold War changes implemented at NATO
made the alliance become weak, without a well-defined mission. NATO’s
mission had become too broad and ad hoc, resulting in an alliance whose purpose had become confused and unclear as it took on more and more security
and humanitarian functions that were arguably not relevant to the allies’ national security interests. Although the criticism came from many quarters,
much of this response was directed at NATO’s decision to expand its alliance
membership to Central and Eastern Europe. By including these newly democratized states into the alliance, NATO was ostensibly creating an organization of needy partners, who were decades behind the United States in their
military capabilities and may not share the same security interests with the
long-standing members of the alliance. An expansion to Eastern Europe especially was a recipe for the alliance’s destruction, as an enlarged alliance
would only further damage relations with Russia. Almost identical criticisms
were raised when NATO expanded again at its 2002 Prague Summit, when the
alliance invited seven additional countries to join its ranks. 7
Many of the arguments that came in the late 1990s and during the administration of President George W. Bush were not necessarily new to the academic literature on NATO. In the early 1990s, in the immediate aftermath of
the Soviet Union’s collapse, analysts most closely associated with the realist
school of thought in international relations similarly stated that NATO’s
death was nearly a sure thing. Noted realist thinkers Waltz and Mearsheimer
argued independently that without an external enemy (i.e., the Soviet Union)
the alliance would lose its reason for existence. In a rather poignant manner,
Mearsheimer noted, “It is the Soviet threat that provides the glue that holds
NATO together. Take away that offensive threat and the United States is
likely to abandon the Continent.”8
Clearly, NATO’s existence during the current Bush administration,
especially in his first term in office, was difficult. The crisis in February 2003
that resulted over Turkey’s invocation of NATO’s Article 4 was one of the
most arduous two weeks in the alliance’s history and should not be underestimated.9 In addition, analysts are correct to highlight the growing divide in
military capabilities between the United States, Europe, and Canada, which
clearly limits the attractiveness of joint military operations.10 Yet despite
these very real problems at NATO, the general tenor of much of the literature
fails to capture why NATO continues to exist and why it remains a central
player in transatlantic security. In contrast to what can be viewed as the
“gloom and doom” scenarios presented of the modern NATO, a more balanced treatment of the alliance begins with an appreciation of its ability to
overcome previous crises, and an understanding of the often traumatic Cold
War debates that similarly seemed to threaten the transatlantic marriage.
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When discussing NATO’s problems today, NATO skeptics undervalue the
vast discord within the alliance during the Cold War, and paint a falsely nostalgic view of NATO’s transatlantic cooperation prior to the Soviet Union’s
collapse. In fact, much like today, NATO faced a number of internal battles
during the Cold War that drove deep wounds into the transatlantic security
community, yet were overcome with institutional evolution and adaptation.

NATO’s History in Overcoming Crises
The threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe kept NATO’s mission focused and limited for over 40 years. Given that the Soviet Union never
invaded any of the NATO allies, and the communist empire began to crumble in
1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO can be considered as one of most
successful military alliances in world history. Yet even a brief overview of
NATO’s history demonstrates that the alliance faced many internal debates,
along with crises that arguably threatened the entirety of the alliance. Although
one could identify a number of divisive policy differences among the allies
during the Cold War, the focus here will be on primarily three crises in
transatlanticism, which at the time—much like today—appeared to threaten
alliance solidarity yet were rather quickly overcome. These events include the
1956 Suez Canal crisis, the French withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command in 1966, and President Ronald Reagan’s decision to bomb Libya
in 1986.
One of NATO’s first major crises was the handling of the Suez Canal
crisis, in which France and the United Kingdom cooperated with Israel to launch
military strikes on Egypt for its decision to nationalize the Suez Canal. The
strikes were conducted without any consultation at NATO and with NATO Secretary General Lord Hastings Ismay out of the decision-making process.11 In
fact, in the early military preparations for the strikes, the British made specific
requests to their French counterparts to avoid any NATO involvement. In response to the strikes, the United States condemned the British-French-Israeli actions, and sided with the Soviet Union and Egypt in calling for the removal of
Israeli forces from the region. Others in the alliance were upset with the British
and French, given that the Soviet Union had just intervened in Hungary to suppress a democratic uprising, and that the alliance’s credibility had now been
threatened due to the open disagreements between allies. US President Dwight
Eisenhower felt that he had been personally betrayed by the British due to the secret planning for the military strikes and the complete absence of consultation
with the United States.12 NATO historian Lawrence S. Kaplan notes that “the result was the near destruction of the alliance as the United States sided with the
Soviets to oppose the Suez Operation.”13
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Yet after the crisis, a case can be made that the American-British relationship actually became stronger. 14 In December 1956, NATO also accepted a report provided by the foreign ministers from Canada, Italy, and
Norway (Lester Pearson, Halvard Lange, and Gaetano Martino), who later
came to be known as NATO’s “Three Wise Men.” Their report, which had
been called for by then US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, allowed for
greater leadership authority from NATO’s secretary general, who could formally propose measures to improve consultation at NATO and oversee all
North Atlantic Council (NAC) sessions; NATO’s official decisionmaking
body. The report also allowed the NAC to broaden its scope of discussion by
allowing any member of the alliance to raise any issue of concern. In addition,
the report reaffirmed the allies’ commitment to greater transatlantic consultation. Although the report had little immediate impact, it is clear that American, British, and French differences over military action in the Middle East
were rather quickly overcome and that the alliance found consensus to work
toward an improved and stronger NATO.15
Among NATO’s most severe crises was the decision by French President Charles de Gaulle to demand the removal of NATO headquarters and
military installations from France in 1966. In response, NATO was forced to
move its political and military headquarters to Belgium and responded institutionally with the creation of the Defense Planning Committee since France
no longer wished to work within NATO’s integrated military command. Analysts have indicated that these events created “the most traumatic moment in
NATO’s history.” Ludwig Erhard, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of
Germany, worried at the time that France’s decisions could make “the world
go apart.”16 American Ambassador to NATO Harlan Cleveland later downplayed the events by quoting a NATO official who maintained that the
“French ‘withdrawal’ was a cheap, anti-American gesture, which changed
almost nothing militarily.” 17 Yet de Gaulle’s demands in fact forced a serious
logistical problem for the allies in the short term. At the time, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
noted that de Gaulle’s decision called for the relocation of “100,000 United
States and NATO personnel and over one million tons of supplies and equipment of all types.”18 In this regard, de Gaulle’s decision suggested an open and
deep division in the military front against the Soviet Union.
However, within a year of these events, NATO successfully relocated
to Belgium. In addition, the alliance issued its Harmel Report, which most importantly, helped to reconcile the different diplomatic approaches preferred by
American and European leaders to face the Soviet challenge. The report called
for the allies to place dual emphasis on defense and détente approaches to address existing Cold War tensions. Although the United States later made clear
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that its emphasis remained on defense, the Harmel Report is still viewed as a
successful moment in NATO’s history, and for the analysis here, provides
meaningful evidence of the alliance’s ability to overcome a crisis of the previous year.19 Even as one of NATO’s most significant members distanced itself
from the alliance, NATO quickly rebounded and made transformative changes
in its mission while maintaining its political and strategic significance.
One additional crisis at NATO occurred when President Ronald
Reagan conducted air strikes against Libya and its leader Muammar Qaddafi
on 14 April 1986. The American strikes came as a result of Libya’s involvement in a previous terrorist strike on a German dance club, which killed two
US soldiers and one Turkish woman, and injured 229 others, including 60
Americans.20 NATO allies were officially informed of the military action
soon after the strikes occurred, when US Ambassador to NATO David M.
Abshire met with NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington and the other
NATO ambassadors to formally share the news. Prior to the attack the NATO
ambassadors and North Atlantic Council were not consulted regarding the
forthcoming military action. The absence of consultation with the allies in
Brussels is noteworthy given that American General Bernard Rogers, then
NATO’s SACEUR, directed the bombings.21
With the exception of support from the Prime Minister from the
United Kingdom, there was almost uniform European opposition to the bombing. Nearly two weeks after the strikes, Lord Carrington stated in an interview
with the BBC: “The situation is as bad between Europe and America as I can remember in the period I have been associated with the alliance.”22 In addition,
France, who had been consulted with bilaterally by the United States prior to
the strikes, had refused to allow the use of its airspace for American military
aircraft en route to Libya. The lack of support generated a visceral response
from the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Vernon Walters, and from
some in the US Congress.23 Yet like its crises before, NATO again moved forward and managed to survive this temporary setback in transatlantic differences. By the year’s end, NATO’s foreign and defense ministers had called
jointly for the Soviet Union to support President Reagan’s arms control efforts.
NATO’s foreign ministers also issued the Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control, again aimed at the Soviet Union. In short, consensus was
again reached on major issues of concern for the alliance, only months after one
of the ostensibly deepest divisions in transatlantic unity.
Besides these three major crises, the NATO allies faced serious political differences during the Cold War over European defense spending levels, the Vietnam War, Germany’s Ostpolitik foreign policy approach, the
Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, the American military invasions of
Grenada and Panama, the deployment of new American cruise and Pershing
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II missiles in Europe, and the United States’ Strategic Defense Initiative,
among a host of issues. 24 Many of these differences evolved around how to
confront the external enemy and were not tertiary to alliance interests; rather
these issues hit at NATO’s political core; its raison d’être. Thus, it is a stretch
to be nostalgic about NATO’s “commonly” shared vision during the Cold
War. NATO’s history is replete with profound transatlantic differences and
internal debates, which the allies overcame. Recent analysts have failed to
recognize NATO’s history of discord, and how the alliance adapted to quite
profound internal crises, much like it is attempting to do today. While there is
no guarantee that NATO will fully overcome its current diplomatic challenges, NATO’s ability to successfully address transatlantic discord suggests
a pattern of dispute resolution and effective adaptation.

NATO’s Prague Summit and Post-9/11 Evolution
Central to NATO’s ability to survive and remain relevant after the
Cold War’s end was the alliance’s willingness to redefine its new mission(s) in
transatlantic security. In doing so, NATO agreed in 1991 to address conflict
prevention and crisis management issues; it extended its diplomatic outreach
and cooperative military partnerships to much of Central and Eastern Europe;
perhaps most significantly NATO used force in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Kosovo, which were followed by major peacekeeping operations in the Balkans.25 Like many of the Cold War deliberations, the changes enacted after the
Soviet Union’s collapse and the bombing operations in the Balkans similarly
entailed considerable debate over the appropriate direction for the alliance. Yet
these changes produced fundamental change at NATO in its security functions.
With the Soviet Union gone, NATO found new roles and can be viewed as a
successful institutional adapter to the era’s new security realities.26 Now, in the
aftermath of 9/11 and the crisis over Iraq, evidence again suggests that the alliance is in another stage of evolution and is anything but irrelevant.
At NATO’s Prague Summit in November 2002, during the lead-up to
the war in Iraq, a number of transformative changes were enacted in the alliance.
Besides its willingness to expand its membership by seven members, its most
fundamental changes were its agreements to create the NATO Response Force
(NRF) and the implementation of a new command structure. The NRF promises
a force of 25,000 troops, which involve air, land, and sea components, and special forces that could be deployed upon five days’ notice for up to one month.
While it has taken some prodding from the United States on its European allies to
create this force, the allies announced at their Riga Summit that the NRF is now
fully functional. Elements of the NRF performed admirably in response to the
humanitarian crisis and earthquake in Pakistan in 2005, and successful training
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operations have been conducted in Operations Steadfast Jackpot and Brilliant
Mariner during 2006. All components of the NRF were tested for the first time
from 14 to 28 June 2006 in Operation Steadfast Jaguar in the Cape Verde Islands.
Much of the initial after-action reports suggest a higher degree of cooperation on
this major facet of NATO’s transformation.
NATO has also successfully adapted its military organizational
structure. At Prague, NATO agreed to reduce its strategic operational commands from two to one. Now, the Allied Commander Operations near Mons,
Belgium, is the headquarters for NATO’s military strategy planning, which is
overseen by the SACEUR. NATO also created a new functional command:
Allied Command Transformation, located in Norfolk, Virginia, to assist in
the alliance’s ongoing evolution. In addition, NATO reduced its regional
command centers from three to two, with commands located in Brunssum,
Netherlands, and Naples, Italy, with an additional smaller headquarters located in Lisbon, Portugal. Its additional subordinate commands were reduced
from 13 to six. This transformation has proceeded successfully. 27 The Prague
Summit also produced a pledge from all the allies to improve their existing
military capabilities, and an informal promise to meet the two percent gross
national product spending level for national defense. These goals have not
been met, and continue to be a sore point in United States-European relations,
presenting real limitations as to how well the alliance can project force and
meet new security threats in the future. 28 At the same time, these developments should not overshadow the progress the alliance has made with regard
to its structural changes and efforts to create the NRF.
Since Operation Iraqi Freedom, another indicator of NATO’s ability
to adapt and find consensus is through its decision to assume the United Nations’ operational leadership role of the International Stabilization Force in
Afghanistan (ISAF). Only five months after NATO’s internal dispute over
Turkey’s invocation of Article 4, at the joint urging of Canada, Germany, and
the United States, NATO assumed control of the United Nations ISAF in August 2003. Current NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has repeatedly emphasized that Afghanistan is the alliance’s number one priority. 29
After initially taking control of the mission, which was limited primarily to
providing security to the national government located in the capital city of
Kabul, the mission expanded to include a number of provisional reconstruction teams (PRTs). The PRTs are small groups of civilian experts who work
alongside NATO forces to foster support for Afghanistan’s democratic government. After overseeing successful national elections in 2004 and 2005,
NATO has now expanded its PRT presence into the more volatile southern regions of Afghanistan, and now oversees the entire allied presence there, including some 35,000 troops under NATO command. Although much higher
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levels of terrorist incidents have been witnessed in Afghanistan since the second half of 2005, a number of analysts point to NATO’s initial success in Afghanistan. Its PRTs have had some success in rebuilding civil society and
schools, fostering new economic growth, and training the new Afghan military.30 NATO faces ongoing political obstacles due to the heightened terrorist
attacks, the surging levels of opium production and heroin trade, and its expansion into southern and eastern Afghanistan.31 Yet the expansion of this
mission, and its early successes in promoting democracy, point to an alliance
that clearly has security relevance.
Besides NATO’s leadership of the ISAF, in 2005 the alliance agreed
to assist the African Union peacekeeping mission in Sudan. Moreover, to the
surprise of many, NATO also found consensus for the creation of a NATO
Training Mission for Iraqi military leaders, where NATO advisers are located
just outside of Baghdad at Ar-Rustamiyah. The mission began in August
2004, and has since trained over 1,000 Iraqi security forces and a small number of senior officers.32 Although the mission is small, consisting of approximately 90 troops from 11 NATO countries, the alliance did manage to find a
role for itself in the ongoing reconstruction efforts in Iraq.33 In addition,
NATO also used elements of its NRF to address the humanitarian crisis after
the earthquake in Pakistan, which involved approximately 1,000 troops.
In sum, with the exception of the ongoing low defense-spending levels in Europe, much of NATO’s evolution since 9/11 suggests that the alliance
is adopting new and salient security operations beyond the European continent. Its operational reach and functional missions have evolved to demonstrate the alliance’s institutional flexibility, and by definition, its ongoing
security relevance. While debate within the alliance has continued over Iraq
and over its current operations, NATO has still managed to meet new and unexpected security challenges.

Impact of NATO Expansion
Despite the profusion of literature that predicted otherwise, ample
evidence now suggests that NATO’s two rounds of enlargement have been
successful policy decisions. Although the military contributions provided by
the newest allies are understandably limited, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that expansion had an immediate impact in stabilizing democratic
civil-military relations in these new member states.
The first positive impact of NATO’s expansion is evident in the democratic stability that the enlargement policy helped foster in NATO’s newest
members. In the applicants’ desire to work with the alliance to gain eventual
admission, which began initially with membership in NATO’s 1994 Partner106

Parameters

ship for Peace Plan, the aspiring states worked closely with alliance officials
who served as catalysts to help these states restructure their militaries in accordance with democratic principles and to reshape their military postures for the
future. All of the allies who gained invitations at the Prague Summit also
worked on NATO’s Membership Action Plan, which was introduced at the
Washington Summit in 1999. Although many of the newest member states still
suffer from a dearth of civilian military professionals, it is nonetheless clear
that NATO exercised a profound influence on the candidate states as they prepared for admission into the alliance.34
In Poland, for example, alliance officials helped the government and
military to comport with alliance guidelines. Epstein notes:
NATO accelerated the consolidation of democratic civilian control in Poland by
removing key elements of Polish military tradition from both the rhetoric and
practice of Polish public policy . . . . Had NATO not provided guidelines for reform
of the armed forces and their governing structures, or had NATO declined to enlarge its membership after the cold war, Polish civilians would not have adopted
NATO’s view as to what it means to secure control over the military by 1999.35

Like Poland, all other applicant states sent military and defense officials to NATO’s English language training centers, where they not only gained
new English skills but also acquired and arguably accepted many of NATO’s
political and military concepts. In doing so, one Romanian defense official,
who was among the hundreds that attended over the years as each applicant
country prepared for membership, noted that the NATO training “made it easier to understand NATO, what it stands for and how it functions,” and that the
courses “opened up a new way of thinking about security.”36 In Romania, the
alliance was also deeply involved in the domestic debates over military defense reforms and played a critical role in shaping how Romania’s military
would be organized and structured in the future.37
Similarly, additional evidence indicates that NATO played an influential role in the Czech Republic as it prepared for admission. While there was
and continues to be some resistance to NATO requests, much of the evidence
demonstrates that the Czechs worked closely with alliance officials in shaping
their reformed military. Again, as put by Gheciu, the “socialization activities
carried out by NATO had a significant impact on the ideas and attitudes of
Czech(s) . . . as well as on the policies and defense-related practices enacted in
Prague.”38 While NATO’s impact has not been equally influential across all of
the Prague invitees, additional research provides comparable supporting evidence for the Baltics, especially in their transitions from communist military
rule to democratically governed militaries according to NATO input.39 In short,
it seems clear that NATO’s Partnership for Peace Plan and later its Membership
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Action Plan resulted in significant and successful efforts by NATO to advance
democratic principles in civil-military relations.
It should be added that many of these new member states continue to
fear the threat of a potentially resurgent Russia. Due in large measure to these
fears, the Madrid and Prague invitees remain very supportive members of the
alliance. For these states, NATO’s security guarantee is arguably the central
component of its national security policy. 40 Thus, the short- and long-term impact of expansion is clearly a more secure, stable, and democratic Europe.
In addition to the benefits of democratic stabilization and military professionalism that came with alliance expansion and continues to occur within aspiring NATO allies, a number of NATO’s newest members have contributed to
the alliance’s external security missions. One example of such an endeavor is
Lithuania’s leadership role in one of NATO’s Provisional Reconstruction Teams
in Afghanistan. Working in the mountainous Ghor province, with its headquarters in Chaghcharan, Lithuania has deployed approximately 120 troops to the
mission, and works alongside NATO allies Denmark and Iceland in carrying out
the operation. As an aspiring NATO ally, Croatia has recently contributed a
small group of mine clearance experts to work in the mission.41
As one of the three states that were invited to join the alliance at the Madrid Summit in 1997, Poland is another new member that was exceptionally supportive of NATO’s bombing campaign in Kosovo in 1999 through its aggressive
condemnations of Slobodan Milosevic and its offers to provide military assistance to the alliance. With NATO’s diplomatic backing, Poland also led a military stabilization mission in Iraq after Operation Iraqi Freedom, and it provided
140 troops to NATO’s humanitarian efforts to Pakistan in 2005.42 Like Lithuania,
membership in NATO brings new opportunities to contribute to global security
in ways that previously seem unlikely in the absence of NATO expansion.
To be sure, serious opposition to NATO’s bombing campaign in
Kosovo surfaced in the Czech Republic only weeks after their formal induction
into the alliance, and statements from the Hungarian Defense Ministry have led
some observes to view Hungary as a free-rider in the alliance.43 In addition,
with the exception of Bulgaria and Romania, the defense spending levels for
the newest member countries have continued to fall short of the two percent
gross national product goals that NATO agreed to informally at the Prague
Summit. Ongoing challenges remain in the area of civil-military relations.44
Yet even in light of these problems, given the benefits of democratic consolidation in Eastern and Central Europe, and the small but consequential contributions to external security provided by some of NATO’s newest members, most
of the evidence leans toward the benefits of NATO’s expansion, which far outweigh the ongoing criticism of alliance expansion. At minimum, there is little
evidence to suggest that enlargement has actually weakened the alliance, espe108
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cially with regard to the decisionmaking procedures and requirements for
consensus. NATO’s most recent public fissures over the alliance’s training
mission in Iraq and its assistance to the African Union in Sudan occurred between the United States and primarily France. Recent divisive discussions at
NATO over the decision to expand the mission in Afghanistan occurred primarily as a result of Dutch domestic opposition.45 The newest allies have not
been an impediment to identifying alliance consensus.
Finally, the impact of NATO’s ongoing “open-door” policy continues to be significant. While NATO skeptics continue to suggest the irrelevance of the alliance, a number of European countries are aggressively
seeking closer relations with NATO. Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Georgia,
the Ukraine and Azerbaijan among others have lobbied aggressively for
NATO membership. In doing so, these states continue to cultivate relations
with the alliance and respond to requests for defense modernization and reform from Brussels.46 In these cases, NATO is anything but irrelevant, but
rather serves as a motivating tool for the implementation of democratic military structures and defense modernization, which for the most part, have
proven successful.

Great Power Leadership
Much of the responsibility for NATO’s survival in the first decade
after the Cold War rests with the Clinton administration, who aggressively
pushed for NATO’s transformation. In this regard, without American leadership and active support from the other major powers of the alliance, NATO’s
relevance would be placed in question. While the differences over Iraq illustrated a deeply divided alliance, a number of events since George W. Bush’s
reelection in 2004 demonstrate that NATO’s place in US foreign policy has
been elevated.
In the second term of his presidency, President Bush’s first trip
abroad was to Europe, which included a stop at NATO headquarters. Similarly, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s first visit abroad was to Europe,
and a visit to NATO. At the symbolic level, the second Bush administration
appeared to be far more committed to multilateral solutions.47
These symbolic efforts were reflective of substantive diplomatic efforts that have come since these visits. The United States has made considerable (and successful) lobbying efforts to expand NATO’s presence into
southern Afghanistan. President Bush also requested in 2006 that NATO take
additional steps to have a wider role in the Sudan, assisting African Union
forces. A bipartisan coalition in the US Senate similarly called for a larger
NATO presence in Sudan.48 US Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and
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Eurasian Affairs, Daniel Fried, noted in May 2006, “Unilateralism is out. Effective multilateralism is in. We are working to make NATO the centerpiece
alliance through which the transatlantic democratic security community
deals with security challenges around the world.”49 Such views reflect a different orientation toward NATO and multilateralism generally, and have resulted in a much more visible role for NATO in American foreign policy.
Besides the Bush administration’s active backing of NATO, the election of German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2005 helped restore the wounded
US-German relationship. In their first meeting and her first trip abroad, Merkel
noted that while differences still remain between the two allies, she chose to emphasize the allies’shared concerns. Moreover, she emphasized the importance of
having a strong NATO. In contrast to her predecessor, she noted that “NATO is
the forum” for discussions of all strategic issues.50 Such words have proven to be
more than rhetoric, as Merkel’s Germany has not stood in the way of NATO’s expanded missions, and has made tangible efforts to increase the deployability of
its troops.51 In addition, recent findings indicate that American and German intelligence officials cooperated quite extensively in the lead up to Operation Iraqi
Freedom, which provides some evidence of a far more functional and cooperative relationship than assumed during Schröder’s administration.52 Given that
Germany plays its own leadership role among the Europeans within the alliance,
the Merkel-Bush relationship provides good signals for a more vibrant and
active alliance.
In the United Kingdom, British defense minister Des Browne has
also proven to be an active and ongoing supporter of NATO’s evolving role by
providing a total of 5,000 troops to the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, many
of whom are now stationed in NATO’s expanded southern presence. Moreover, on NATO’s Response Force, Browne has noted that it is “key to our vision for the modern NATO, capable of mounting the full range of military
missions.”53 In light of widespread public misgivings about Iraq and cooperation with the United States in Iraq, the British government only seems to be
more engaged in the alliance.
While not a “major” power in NATO, even Spain has assumed a new
leadership role in the alliance by serving as the alliance’s lead country in the
humanitarian mission to Pakistan by providing 370 troops to the operation. In
addition, Spain currently has 700 troops deployed in Afghanistan.54 These developments have all come since the defeat in 2004 of Spain’s former prime
minister, Jose Maria Anzar, whose opponent actively campaigned against
Spain’s cooperation with the United States in Iraq. Clearly, a case can be made
that while the government continues to have its differences with the Bush administration in Iraq, its support for NATO operations and missions abroad has
grown stronger.
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To be sure, France remains a reluctant ally within NATO and continues
to make the identification of consensus a difficult task. French and American differences were the key reason for the delayed response to the African Union’s request for NATO’s assistance in Darfur in 2005. Moreover, in the planning stages
for NATO’s presence in Iraq, France also raised most of the concerns and objections. More recently, France opposed the United States’ originally proposed site
of Mauritania for Operation Steadfast Jaguar, the largest operational test of
NATO’s Response Force.55 In this respect, France is acting quite unlike its 1990s
détente with the alliance.56 Current French opposition to NATO, however,
should be placed in the larger context of NATO’s history, which reflects a
long-standing debate between France and the United States over the appropriate
security role for NATO. The fact that France has different views from the United
States and many of its European allies is nothing new to transatlantic security issues.57 In addition, unlike in 2002 and 2003, with the Merkel government now
more in accord with the United States, France is far more isolated in objecting to
American leadership within the alliance, which may provide some explanation
for France’s willingness to contribute to NATO’s Response Force.
In sum, a number of diplomatic indicators point to an alliance that is
rebuilding after its 2003 quarrels. In contrast to much that is written, NATO’s
position in transatlantic security affairs remains far more relevant than its
critics suggest.

Conclusion
Much like during the Cold War, when transatlantic tensions and periodic crises seemed to often threaten the core of the alliance, NATO is again recovering from its bitter disputes in 2003. In contrast to the abundance of
NATO skepticism from current analysts, a more balanced assessment of the
alliance’s health indicates that another progressive evolution is underway. Its
institutional flexibility after 9/11, the allies’ progress toward its Rapid Response Force, the positive and ongoing impact of NATO expansion, and the
new evidence of great power support for transatlantic cooperation are all
signs that NATO is far from dead, but rather is again resuming a central place
in global security affairs.
Indeed, NATO faces new and increasingly difficult challenges in promoting democracy and stability in Afghanistan. Unless NATO finds a way to
stem the Taliban’s growing influence and the increasingly high rate of suicide
terrorism attacks, which the United States and coalition forces have thus far
failed to stop in Iraq, NATO will be enmeshed in the region for years to come.
Moreover, the omnipresent military spending gap between the United States and
all other 25 allies has not only short-term, but long-term implications. Although
some positive signs exist due to Europe’s increased integration in the NATO ReSpring 2007
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sponse Force, which may suggest improvements in European capability to deploy forces outside of Europe, the wide differences in military spending makes
Europe an increasingly less attractive military partner over time. Some analysts
have suggested that only slight adjustments in defense spending decisions will
allow European governments to generate much more useful force structures, especially with the likely future needs for small groups of special operation
forces.58 Yet such steps still need to be taken, so defense spending remains an ongoing concern, but is an area that does have potential for progress.
Despite these problems, as demonstrated above, NATO’s skeptics fail
to consider the growing multilateral cooperation within the alliance, especially
in the second Bush administration. A more centrist and multilateral American
foreign policy direction, which has been witnessed in 2005 and 2006 in multiple ways at NATO, including initiatives related to Iran and North Korea, bodes
well for NATO’s future, and more accurately captures the alliance’s current
role(s) and future prospects for fostering transatlantic security consensus.
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